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Abstract
Enforcement, Regulation and Development
Jean-Jacques Laffont
After discussing examples of enforcement failures for regulatory contracts in
Africa, we develop a regulation model with asymmetric information and im-
perfect enforcement. Either the regulator succeeds in forcing the regulated
firm to fulfill the contract or renegotiation takes place. The probability of
renegotiation decreases with the level of enforcement expenditures which is
also chosen by the regulator. We show that the endogenous level of enforce-
ment decreases with the proneness to corruption and document empirically
this relationship.
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“There is a growing international consensus... that regulation, particularly in
poor countries, must be designed with an appreciation of both information
asymmetries and difficulties of enforcement”
World Development Report 2001/2.
1 Introduction
Regulatory contracts, as any other contractual relationships, suffer in less developed coun-
tries (LDCs) from a severe lack of enforcement. Good laws and rules are rather straight-
forward to import from the developed world. A good set of lawyers can transfer this
institutional knowledge quite easily (if not cheaply). It is much more difficult to enforce
them, because of the lack of financial and technical resources, because of the corruption
of enforcement institutions, and because of the weak bargaining position of regulators.
The vital role of enforcement for laws, rules and contracts was stressed first by the
Chicago school (Becker (1968), Stigler (1970), Becker and Stigler (1974)). They modeled
economic agents as performing a cost-benefit analysis when they breach the law and they
reflected on the role of punishments and their limitations due to corruption and limited
liability.
In the law and economics literature (Posner (1972), Polinsky (1983)), there has been
a lot of work on breach of contracts and on the types of remedies which can be offered
by the law. However, the emphasis is there, not on how to react to renegations on
contracts in fully anticipated states of nature, but rather on how laws can simply deal
with circumstances arising from unexpected states of nature. It is more about how the law
can be an efficient substitute to the excessive transaction costs resulting from an attempt
to include in contracts all possible contingencies.
The contract literature has developed initially without worrying about the verifiability
and contractibility of the actions specified in the contracts. More recently, attention has
shifted towards those issues. For example, the income taxation literature has started with
Mirrlees (1971) by assuming that incomes are observable. It was only much later (Border
and Sobel (1987), Mookherjee and Png (1989), Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990))
that lies of taxpayers about their incomes and the need for auditing incomes were taken
into account. Actually, many LDCs are still unable to implement income taxes because
of enforcement issues.
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Similarly, the costly state verification literature in loan contracting with asymmetric
information (Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)) arose from the difficulties of
indexing the repayment of a loan on the firm’s revenue, because of this latter’s ability to
hide its revenue. This transaction cost was used to motivate debt contracts which specify
payments unconditional on the firm’s revenue.
Also, in the procurement literature the need for auditing costs was taken into account
(Baron and Besanko (1984)) with attention given to imperfect commitment of auditing
procedures (Khalil (1992)) and to the corruption of auditors (Laffont and Tirole (1992)).
In this work, the verification of states of nature is costly, but the enforcement is assumed
to be perfect when auditing is successful. Krasa and Villamil (2000) is an exception where
costly enforcement is a decision variable and where they show that imperfect commitment
makes debt contracts optimal.1
In contrast, we assume in this paper that the enforcement of contracts does not solve
the asymmetric information problem, but simply forces the regulated firm to select an
outcome in the set of allocations agreed upon contractually ex ante. This description
of enforcement seems particularly adapted to LDCs and to regulation where solving the
asymmetric information problem following a dispute seems much too costly to be realistic
and too much opened to manipulation.
In Section 2, we discuss briefly some of the major regulatory issues specific to African
economies that are encountered in the current privatization and liberalization move-
ment. Section 3 describes a number of enforcement failures of regulatory contracts in
the Telecommunications industry in Africa. Section 4 recaps a basic regulation model
inspired from the new regulatory economics. A regulated utility has private information
about its cost function and can also decrease cost by an unobservable effort. Cost is ex
post observable. The regulatory contract is written before the firm discovers its type
(for simplicity, two types only are considered), so that the firm’s participation constraint
is an ex ante constraint. Consequently, with perfect enforcement of contracts, optimal
regulation achieves the full information optimum. However, the ex post utility of an inef-
ficient type is negative. If the regulator cannot enforce such negative utility levels for the
firm, it must resort to self-enforcing contracts which ensure ex post non negative levels of
utility. Optimal regulation is then identical to the one obtained when the regulator offers
a contract after the firm discovers its type. It entails downward distortions of production
to achieve the optimal rent extraction-efficiency trade-off. Against these benchmarks we
develop in Section 5 a model with imperfect enforcement. The regulator offers a menu
of contracts from which the firm must select. With some probability which depends on
enforcement expenditures, the firm is indeed forced to choose one contract in the menu.
1The Townsend-Gale-Hellwig result justifying debt contracts was criticized because they ignored
stochastic contracts.
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With the complementary probability the contract is renegotiated. Then, we characterize
the optimal menu of contracts and the optimal enforcement expenditures. In particular,
we find that the optimal level of enforcement decreases with the cost of public funds and
with the efficiency of ex post bargaining. In Section 6, we extend the model to account
for corruption in the regulatory process and we show that the more prone to corruption
the country is the lower the optimal level of enforcement. These results provide some the-
oretical support to the positive correlation between the level of development and the size
of the informal sector (where tax laws are not enforced) largely discussed in development
economics. In Section 7, we provide empirical results about a more direct relationship
between the level of corruption and the quality of enforcement. We conclude in Section
8.
2 Regulation in Africa
In the nineties, largely under the pressure of the IMF and the World Bank, the privatiza-
tion and liberalization movement has reached Africa and has even concerned the public
services such as water, electricity, railways and telecommunications.
Those operations have been conducted sometimes in a hurry (like the privatization of
electricity in Coˆte d’Ivoire), sometimes very slowly (seven years for telecommunications in
Coˆte d’Ivoire), but always within the conceptual framework inherited from the Western
World, in the best cases with some knowledge of the Latin America experience.
The specificities of African countries have received little attention, and when they were
considered it was very pragmatically. One reason is that there has been very little research
in the theory of regulation for developing countries.2 Some fundamental questions await
theoretical and empirical systematic research. Let us list a few.
Should one pay the social cost of restructuring before privatization to attract capital,
or is it better to liquidate bankrupt public firms immediately? Marocco has a systematic
approach of privatizing only well restructured and profitable firms. Subsaharan countries
often cannot afford financially or politically such restructurations. The privatization of
electricity in Coˆte d’Ivoire was the one of a bankrupt monopoly. Today Coˆte d’Ivoire
exports electricity instead of being an importer before privatization.
Given the high concern for poverty, the fact that public employees often support large
families in the country side, what are the optimal downsizing policies associated with
restructuring?
The lack of auditing resources constrains a lot the types of regulation mechanisms
2A few exceptions include Laffont (1996), (1999), Ordover et alii (1994).
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(cost of service regulation is only possible if cost is indeed observed). Given the various
industries to regulate how should these scarce resources be allocated? More broady how
should reform proceed given the resources and political constraints?
What should be the balance between designing a competitive ex post industry struc-
ture (which ensures more efficiency ex post, but might discourage ex ante competition) or
granting monopoly rights more attractive to investors, but sustaining ex post inefficien-
cies? How should this balance be affected by the strength and credibility of regulatory
institutions? In Telecommunications, Zambia aimed at a very competitive industry and
attracted nobody. Coˆte d’Ivoire was critized for granting a seven years monopoly for
fixed link telephony. Ghana issued two licenses of fixed link telephony but the weakness
of the regulator did not avoid foreclosure behavior of the incumbent monopolist so that
the second operator is not operational.
Given the specificities of African economies concerning the cost of public funds, the
auditing resources, the lack of commitment power and of checks and balances, the ineffi-
ciencies of capital markets, the weakness of the rule of law, what are the best regulation
methods, what is the best rent extraction-efficiency trade-off of incentive regulation?
In particular, LDCs suffer tremendously from a weakness of enforcement capabilities
which completely denaturate the regulatory contracts and call for very different choices
than those which would be made in countries where reneging on contracts is too costly.
Alarmed by the wave of disputes and renegotiations following the huge privatization move-
ment in Latin America, the World Bank has built a data basis to analyze the disturbing
fact that concessions are renegotiated after an average of 2.1 years only. All those issues
call for specific theoretical and empirical research. However, only a step by step approach
seems fruitful from the theoretical point of view.
In the next section we give examples of enforcement failures in the telecommunications
industry of Africa to motivate the following sections of this paper which explore how
optimal incentive regulation should be affected by enforcement failures.
3 Enforcement Failures
• Ghana’s Telecommunications
The targeted design of the Ghanaian Telecommunications industry was unusually com-
petitive for Africa, with three mobile operators and two fixed wire line networks. However,
the regulator turned out to be particularly weak and “despite its well-intentioned law, the
weakness of enforcement has left telecommunication consumers at the mercy of a battle
of influence between the champions of the various players. One serious casualty may be
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Ghana’s credibility with investors” Haggarty and Shirley (1999).
A spectacular example of lack of enforcement is the fact that the incumbent monopoly
for fixed telephony3 GT who was not allowed to enter the mobile business did enter, and
furthermore used all kinds of tactics to delay interconnection.4 Furthermore, interconnec-
tion disputes with GT have also prevented the second fixed link operator from entering
until recently.
• Tanzania’s Telecommunications
In Tanzania the regulator attempted to enforce regional mobile licenses. However,
the dominant mobile operator Mobitel argued that its license was national, and launched
service in an area where the regulator tried to shut down the operator. After a crisis
involving the court and the President of the country all cellular licenses were declared
national in scope.
At the opposite governments and regulators also break contracts. In Tanzania the
initial two cellular operators complained that the Government commitments to having
only two or three operators in the market was reneged on with impunity.5
• Coˆte d’Ivoire’s Telecommunications
The concession contract of CItelecom specified quality levels and an expansion program
of fixed lines which repeatedly have not been satisfied. Despite the existence of penalties
in the contract, the regulator has not exercised these penalties and has not succeeded in
implementing the contract.
CItelecom has priced access for public phones built by the competitor Publicom at
a price of 65 FCFA per impulse, while the price in its own public phones was 73. The
margin of 8 FCFA was to small to allow entry. In August 1998 the regulator intervened
to set a minimum price of 85 FCFA for CItelecom’s own call boxes. However, CItelecom
refused6 to adjust its prices until very recently and since then imposes long delays for
connecting competitors’ call boxes.
More generally, the size of the informal economy can be viewed as a measure for the
weakness of law enforcement. It is by now well established that the size of the shadow
economy as a percentage of GDP is larger in developing than developed countries (see
Schneider and Enste (2000)) and that there is a positive correlation between the size of
3It was bought by Telekom Malaysia through a competitive tender.
4GT has been charging cellular companies more that its local retail tariff.
5We will not develop this dimension of renegotiation. See Aubert and Laffont (2001) for a model of
political renegotiation.
6The reason put forward by CItelecom to justify their behavior is that they consider that public phones
belong to the fixed network and therefore fall into their monopoly license.
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the informal economy and higher corruption. Johnson et alii (1998) finds that a one point
improvement in the corruption index (using either the Transparency International measure
of corruption or the Global Competitiveness Survey measure of bribery) is associated with
around a 4 percentage point fall in the share of the informal economy, after controlling
for per capita income.
4 Optimal Regulation
We consider a natural monopoly which, in addition to a fixed cost F which is common
knowledge has a variable cost function:
C = (β − e)q, (4.1)
where q is the production level, β is an adverse selection parameter in {β, β¯} with ν =
Pr(β = β) and e is a moral hazard variable which decreases cost, but creates to the
manager a disutility ψ(e) with ψ′(·) > 0, ψ′′ > 0, ψ′′′ ≥ 0.
Consumers derive an utility S(q), S ′ > 0, S ′′ < 0 from the consumption of the natural
monopoly’s good. Let p(·) the inverse demand function and tˆ the transfer to the firm from
the regulator. The firm’s net utility writes:
U = tˆ + p(q)q − (β − e)q − F − ψ(e). (4.2)
We assume that cost is ex post observable by the regulator as well as the price and the
quantity. So, we can make the accounting assumption that revenues and cost are incurred
by the regulator, who pays a net transfer t = tˆ + p(q)q − (β − e)q − F . Accordingly, the
participation constraint of the firm can be written:
U = t− ψ(e) ≥ 0. (4.3)
To finance the transfer t, the government must raise taxes with a cost of public funds
1 + λ, λ > 0. Hence, consumers’ net utility is
V = S(q)− p(q)q − (1 + λ)t. (4.4)
Utilitarian social welfare writes then:
W = U + V = S(q) + λp(q)q − (1 + λ)((β − e)q + F + ψ(e))− λU. (4.5)
Under complete information, the maximization of social welfare would lead to:
S ′(q∗) + λ(p′(q∗)q∗ + p(q∗)) = (1 + λ)(β − e∗) (4.6)
ψ′(e∗) = q∗ (4.7)
U = 0. (4.8)
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Let us denote, for β and β¯ respectively, the solutions of (4.6), (4.7), (4.8)7 as q∗, e∗, U∗
and q¯∗, e¯∗, U¯∗.
Since consumers equate their marginal utility to the price (S ′(q) = p), (4.8), which
says that social marginal utility equals social marginal cost, can be rewritten as a Lerner
index formula:
p− (β − e)
p
=
λ
1 + λ
1
η(p)
,
where η(p) is the price elasticity of demand. The price is between the marginal cost (β−e)
and the monopoly price pM defined by(
pM − (β − e)
pM
=
1
η(p)
)
.
The marginal disutility of effort ψ′(e) is equated to its marginal social gain q, and no
rent is given up to the firm because funds are socially costly (λ > 0).
Suppose now that the regulator cannot observe the effort level e and does not know
β. However, he can offer a contract to the firm before the latter discovers its type (see
Figure 1 for the timing).
-
TimeThe regulator
offers
the regulatory
contract
The firm
accepts or not
the contract
The firms
discovers
its
type β
Production
and
transfer
take place
Figure 1
In addition to the participation constraint, the regulator’s contract must now satisfy
the firm’s incentive constraints because of incomplete information. The firm’s utility level
can be rewritten by substitution of (4.1) in (4.3):
U = t− ψ(β − c), (4.9)
where c = C
q
is average cost. (4.9) shows that the observability of cost reduces the problem
to a simple adverse selection problem. From the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of
generality in restricting the analysis to direct revelation mechanisms {(t, c), (t¯, c¯)} which
specify for each message β˜ = β or β˜ = β¯ an average cost to achieve and a net transfer
from the regulator.
7We make the appropriate assumptions on S(·) so that W is strictly concave in (q, e). For more details
and motivations about the various assumptions see Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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The regulatory contract also recommends a production level q (or q¯) and a total cost
C (or C¯), compatible with c (or c¯) (between which the firm is indifferent) which maximize
expected social welfare.
However, the direct revelation mechanism must be truthful, i.e., must satisfy the
incentive constraints
U = t− ψ(β − c) ≥ t¯− ψ(β − c¯) (4.10)
U¯ = t¯− ψ(β¯ − c¯) ≥ t− ψ(β¯ − c). (4.11)
Since the firm must accept or reject the contract before it knows its type, its partici-
pation constraint must be written ex ante, i.e.:
νU + (1− ν)U¯ ≥ 0. (4.12)
The incentive constraints (4.10) (4.11) can be rewritten:
U ≥ U¯ + Φ(e¯) (4.13)
U¯ ≥ U − Φ(e +∆β), (4.14)
where Φ(e) = ψ(e)− ψ(e−∆β), Φ′ > 0, Φ′′ > 0.
Finally, the regulator’s maximization program writes:
(P ) : max ν
[
S(q) + λp(q)q − (1 + λ)(cq + ψ(β − c))− λU]
+(1− ν) [S(q¯) + λp(q¯)q¯ − (1 + λ)(c¯q¯ + ψ(β¯ − c¯))− λU¯] ,
s.t. (4.10) (4.11) (4.12).
It is more transparent to rewrite this program in terms of the variables (q, e, U) rather
than (q, c, U). Let us also denote W (q, e, β) the complete information ex post social
welfare for a production level q and an effort level e when the efficiency parameter is β,
i.e.:
W (q, e, β) = S(q) + λp(q)q − (1 + λ) ((β − e)q + F + ψ(e)) . (4.15)
The regulator’s program rewrites:
(P ) : max ν
[
W (q, e, β)− λU] + (1− ν) [W (q¯, e¯, β¯)− λU¯]
s.t.
U ≥ U¯ + Φ(e¯) (4.16)
U¯ ≥ U − Φ(e +∆β) (4.17)
νU + (1− ν)U¯ ≥ 0, (4.18)
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Actually, the regulator can saturate the participation constraint and maximize social
welfare. For each value of β he finds the complete information optimum. It remains to
check if one can find values of rents (or net transfers) such that (4.16) and (4.17) are
satisfied. There are many such transfers. If we saturate (4.16) we get:
U¯ = −νΦ(e¯) (4.19)
or
t¯ = ψ(e¯)− νΦ(e¯). (4.20)
If we saturate (4.17), we get instead:
U¯ = −νΦ(e +∆β)
or
t¯ = ψ(e¯)− νΦ(e +∆β). (4.21)
Any value of t¯ between those obtained in (4.20) and (4.21) would work. Adding (4.16)
and (4.17) we obtain:
Φ(e +∆β) ≥ Φ(e¯). (4.22)
The main point to notice is that the inefficient type β¯’s ex post utility is always
negative and, from (4.22), the largest ex post utility is obtained when we saturate (4.13).
This negative ex post utility raises the issue of enforcement. Indeed, once it discovers
its type β¯ the firm would like to renege on the regulatory contract. In a country with
strong institutions, the contract is enforced in both states of nature β and β¯. As a
consequence, asymmetric information does not create any transaction cost for society and
the complete information optimal allocation is achieved despite the setting of incomplete
information.
At the other extreme, suppose that the regulator anticipates that he will not be able
to enforce a negative ex post utility level for the firm. Then, he will chose a regulatory
contract which maximizes expected social welfare under the incentive constraints, but
also the ex post participation constraints:
U ≥ 0 (4.23)
U¯ ≥ 0. (4.24)
The set of constraints is then the same as if the contract was offered to the firm at
the interim stage, i.e., once it knows its type. Then, we can anticipate that the efficient
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type’s incentive constraint (4.16) and the inefficient type’s participation constraint (4.24)
will be the binding ones. Substituting into the objective function of the regulator, we
obtain:
ψ′(e¯SB) = q¯SB − λ
1 + λ
· ν
1− νΦ
′(e¯SB) (4.25)
ψ′(eSB) = qSB = q∗ (4.26)
U = Φ(e¯SB) > 0, (4.27)
and the same pricing equations as under complete information.8
Now, the efficient type captures a positive rent, and to decrease somewhat this socially
costly rent the regulator decreases the effort level in the case β = β¯. However, the efficient
type’s effort level is not distorted.
Then, the loss in expected social welfare due to the extreme weakness of enforcement
institutions and the need to rely on self-enforcing contracts writes:
∆W SB = λνΦ(e¯SB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rent Loss
+(1− ν) [W (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯)−W (q¯SB, e¯SB, β¯)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Efficiency Loss
. (4.28)
5 Regulation and Enforcement
We want to model now more precisely what happens when institutions ensure only an
imperfect enforcement of regulatory contracts.
We will assume that when the firm obtains an ex post negative utility, it attempts
to renegotiate its regulatory contract. However, with a probability pi(c), the regulator is
able nevertheless to impose the implementation of the agreed upon contract.9 This prob-
ability depends on the expenses c incurred to set up an efficient enforcement mechanism:
We assume that pi(0) = 0, pi′ > 0, pi′′ < 0 with the Inada conditions pi′(0) = ∞ and
limc→∞ pi(c) = 1.
With probability 1− pi(c) the regulator is forced to accept a renegotiation. To model
this renegotiation we use the Nash bargaining solution but assume that renegotiation is
costly (become it takes time say). The status quo payoffs which obtain if the negotiation
8This is due to the fact that the cost function we have chosen satisfies the separability assumption
C(q, h(β, e)) which implies the dichotomy property, i.e., the absence of incentive correction in the pricing
formula (see Laffont and Tirole (1993)).
9We do not allow for penalties when enforcement is successful. This seems more descriptive of real
practice in regulation (limited penalties would not change the flavor of the results), probably because
often regulatory agencies are not allowed to impose penalties and do not want to go to court if they
manage to enforce the contract. When enforcement is not successful, costly renegotiation is ex post
better than enforcing penalties.
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fails are determined as follows: The firm loses its fixed cost and gets the utility level
U0 = −F . The regulator is also penalized by a loss of reputation and obtains the utility
level W0 = −H.
We will make appropriate assumptions so that the efficient type firm never wants
to renege on its contract.10 Therefore, costly bargaining takes place under complete
information, only when β = β¯. Its outcome solves:
max
{q¯,e¯,U¯E}
{
(U¯E − U0)(δW (q¯, e¯, β¯)− λU¯E −W0) = (U¯E + F )(δW (q¯, e¯, β¯)− λU¯E + H)
}
,
with δ in (0, 1) to model the cost of renegotiation.
It yields the complete information production and effort levels q¯∗, e¯∗ and the rent level
U¯E =
δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯) + H
2λ
− F
2
, (5.1)
i.e., the firm and the regulator share equally the social surplus. Social welfare is then
W¯E =
δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯)−H + λF
2
. (5.2)
The higher the fixed cost, the lower the firm’s rent from renegotiation and the higher
social welfare will be despite renegotiation. The weaker the regulator position in case of
unsuccessful renegotiation (the higher H), the lower is social welfare.
We still need the offer of contracts to be incentive compatible (conditions (4.16), (4.17))
and the new ex ante participation constraint writes
νU + (1− ν)pi(c)U¯ + (1− ν)(1− pi(c))U¯E ≥ 0. (5.3)
Substituting the outcome of renegotiation into the regulator’s objective function, it
becomes
ν[W (q, e, β)− λU ] + (1− ν)pi(c)[W (q¯, e¯, β¯)− λU¯ ]
+(1− ν)(1− pi(c)) [δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯)− λU¯E]− (1 + λ)c. (5.4)
Maximizing by saturating the participation constraint we obtain:
qE = q∗ ; eE = e∗ (5.5)
q¯E = q¯∗ ; e¯E = e¯∗ (5.6)
(1− ν)pi′(cE) = 1 + λ
(1− δ)W (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯) . (5.7)
10See Appendix 1. From Bester and Strausz (2000) we can restrict the analysis to pairs of contracts.
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Clearly, it is valuable to build an enforcement institution only when the social welfare
obtained by the initial contract for β = β¯ is higher than what would result from rene-
gotiation (W (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯) > δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯)). The more efficient is renegotiation (δ higher),
the smaller cE. More efficient renegotiation and more enforcement are substitute instru-
ments.11
What are the main features of the solution obtained above? First, an enforcement
mechanism is financed. It is imperfect and its quality is determined by (5.7). The quality
of enforcement decreases (and therefore the probability of renegotiation increases) with
the cost of public funds and with the efficiency of ex post bargaining. Second, the power
of incentives is not intermediary between those which will be obtained with perfect en-
forcement (high powered) and self-enforcing contracts (low powered). This is because any
rent obtained ex post through renegotiation is captured ex ante in the contract offered
by the government. Third, the status quo payoffs of the two players who bargain do not
affect the outcome, because again the rent given up in the bargaining is recaptured ex
ante as bargaining is anticipated. If these payoffs affected the efficiency (δ) of bargaining,
of course, they would matter.
Note that, if bargaining was efficient, then the analog of (5.7) would imply that cE = 0.
But, then the efficient type would want to mimic the inefficient type because he would
get a rent of Φ(e¯∗) rather than Φ(e¯).12 Bargaining would then occur ex post for all types
under incomplete information, and the only thing the regulator would have gain by not
offering a self enforcing contract would be eventually to lose the bargaining power he had
ex ante. Indeed, the welfare of the self enforcing contract is the best he could obtain ex
post if he had all the bargaining power.13
Remark: Another interpretation of δ (which should then affect also U¯E) could be some
ability of the regulator to commit not to renegotiate. As an extreme case, the regulator
might be able to end the relationship if the enforcement mechanism is not successful.
Then (5.7) is replaced by
(1− ν)pi′(cE) = 1 + λ
W (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯) + H + F
.
The more the regulator would suffer from the failure to enforce the contract (H high)
and the higher the lost fixed cost F , the higher the investment in enforcement.
However, if the enforcement mechanism is not very efficient, it could be that (due to
11This is true locally, i.e., as long as the efficient type’s incentive constraint is not binding.
12This is true as long as the inefficient type wants to renegotiate. However, if the sunk cost is very
large, then U¯E < 0 and the inefficient type does not want to renege despite the fact that the contract is
never enforced because he loses too much in the renegotiation.
13The same reasoning would apply to semi-separating equilibria in which efficient firms mimic inefficient
ones only with some probability.
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the loss of trade when enforcement fails) the optimal solution obtained above is dominated
by self-enforcing contracts.
Indeed, the welfare loss with respect to the first best writes now:
∆WE = (1− ν)(1− pi(cE))(1− δ)W (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯) Bargaining Costs
+(1 + λ)cE Enforcement Costs.
However, it may be a little misleading to include in the welfare loss the enforcement
costs, since it suggests that the enforcement institutions which yield the first-best in
developed countries are costless. Actually, they are not really comparable. In some sense
they have been partly sunk in the past so that they are relatively small in comparison
with the enforcement needed today in a developing country to eradicate opportunistic
behavior.
Still, ∆WE is the right expression to compare to ∆W SE obtained in (4.28) to know if
it is worth setting up an (imperfect) enforcement institution rather than relying only on
self-enforcing contracts.
6 Enforcement and Corruption
Let us extend the basic model with a regulatory body which helps the government to
bridge partially its information gap with the regulated firm.
The regulator observes a signal σ in {φ, β}. More specifically, with probability ξ the
regulator observes σ = β when indeed β = β and nothing otherwise. Furthermore, σ = β
is a hard information signal which is therefore contractible.
The regulator’s utility function is V (s) = s ≥ 0, where s is his payment from the
government.
Suppose first that the regulator is benevolent. Then, with probability νξ, the gov-
ernment is informed that the firm is a β-firm and can achieve the optimal complete
information regulation characterized by (4.6), (4.7), (4.8).
If σ = φ, the government computes its posterior beliefs νˆ = ν(1−ξ)
1−νξ and the optimal
regulation under incomplete information and imperfect enforcement characterized in (5.5)
to (5.7) where νˆ replaces ν.
If the regulator is not benevolent, it means that it must be rewarded when he transmits
the verifiable signal σ = β to avoid collusion with the agent. Indeed, if the β-firm convinces
the regulator to claim that, contrary to the truth, it has observed nothing, it captures the
15
rent Φ(e¯C).
The collusion-proof constraint writes s ≥ kΦ(e¯C) with k in (0, 1). Collusion proofness14
entails consequently an additional expected social cost λνξkΦ(e¯C) in the government’s
objective function (5.4) which becomes:
νξW (q∗, e∗, β) + ν(1− ξ)[W (q, e, β)− λU ]
+(1− ν)pi(c)[W (q¯, e¯, β¯)− λU¯ ] + (1− ν)(1− pi(c))[δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯)− λU¯C ]
−(1 + λ)c− λνξkΦ(e¯C).
Hence, the first-order conditions:
qC = q∗ ; eC = e∗
ψ′(e¯C) = q¯C − λ
1 + λ
· νkξ
1− ν
Φ(e¯C)
pi(cC)
S ′(q¯C) + λ[p′(q¯C)q¯C + p(q¯C)] = (1 + λ)(β¯ − e¯C)
(1− ν)pi′(cC) = 1 + λ
W (q¯C , e¯C , β¯)− δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯) .
The comparative statics analysis of this system yields immediately (see Appendix 2).
Proposition 1 :
dcC
dk
< 0
dq¯C
dk
< 0
de¯C
dk
< 0.
In a country prone to corruption (k high), optimal regulation leads to less high pow-
ered incentive schemes (because informational rents are more costly), to less production
and higher prices (because costs are higher due to lower effort levels induced by low pow-
ered incentive schemes), and more importantly for our analysis here, to less enforcement.
Indeed, enforcement is less valuable (because of the distortions described above).
We recalled in Section 3 that there is a well established negative correlation between
the quality of law enforcement and the level of development or the level of corruption.
The above result shows that low enforcement is in fact an optimal regulatory response to
the proneness to corruption and not necessarily an institutional weakness in itself.
The welfare loss due to asymmetric information and enforcement costs is now
14See Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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∆WC = (1− ν)pi(cC)[W (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯)−W (q¯C , e¯C , β¯)] Efficiency loss due to the Rent Extraction
- Efficiency Trade-Off.
+(1− ν)(1− pi(cC))(1− δ)W (q¯∗, e¯∗, β) Bargaining Costs.
+(1 + λ)cC Enforcement Costs.
+λνξkΦ(e¯C) Incentive Costs of Regulators.
Finally, note also the possible countervailing effect. The optimal enforcement level
decreases with ξ. A less efficient regulation associated with a LDC, in the sense of a
lower value of ξ, leads to more enforcement because it decreases the cost of collusion-
proofness hence increases efficiency, hence increases the gain from enforcement. A More
direct link that the direct link which would arise from a corruption of the enforcement
system itself. For example if pi(·) = θpi(·), θ appears as a measure of lack of corruption in
the enforcement system and indeed we obtain directly dc
C
dθ
> 0.
Data about the enforcement of regulation or the probability of renegotiation allowing
an econometric study are not yet available for Africa. In the next section we investigate
the correlation between corruption and the quality of enforcement on more general data
sets and point out an Africa effect.
7 Empirical Correlation between Corruption and the
Enforcement of Contracts
For the corruption variable we use two measures15 denoted KAUFCOR from Kaufman et
alii (1999) and TICORR98 for transparency international. For the quality of enforcement
we use either the rule of law variable (KAUFRUL) from Kaufman et alii (1999) or the law
and order variable (PRSLOR) from PRS-ICRG. Using two stage least squares with the
instruments (IMPGDP for openess = Imports / GDP from the WBDR and PRICDIST
as the index of price distortions (for Freedom House)). One can expect these variables
associated with rents which can be captured to be correlated with corruption and not
(at least much less) with the rule of law. We also introduce a dummy variable for the
countries of Sub-Sahara Africa. We obtain Tables 1, 2, 3.
15See Appendix 3 for more details on data.
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Table 1
Endogenous Variable KAUFRUL
LS TSLQ TSLQ TSLS TSLS
C 0.89 0.60 -2.25 -2.07 -2.19
(1.84) (0.47) (-1.29) (-1.18) (-1.21)
GNP98 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06
(-2.70) (-0.91) (1.16) (1.08) (1.10)
TICORR98 0.66 0.71
(9.68) (3.80)
KAUFCOR 1.16 1.12 1.14
(4.54) (4.22) (4.20)
SSA 0.25 0.06
(0.69) (0.18)
R2 0.83 0.83 0.70 0.75 0.74
SE 0.91 0.92 1.19 1.17 1.19
N 76 74 100 100 100
The corruption variables are significant even after being instrumented. Furthermore
a Hausman test shows that TICORR98 can be considered as exogenous (but not KAUR-
COR).
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Table 2
Endogenous Variable PRSLOR 98
LS TSLS TSLS TLSL
C 0.91 1.58 0.36 1.59
(0.95) (0.84) (0.12) (0.54)
GNP98 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.07
(-1.96) (1.47) (-0.39) (-0.75)
TICORR98 0.55 0.46
(4.11) (1.77)
KAUFCOR 0.69 0.45
(1.64) (1.02)
SSA 1.21
(2.04)
R2 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.59
SE 1.77 1.77 1.84 1.80
N 76 74 92 92
The corruption variables are less significant with PRSLOR98 as an endogenous vari-
able. The SSA dummy is more significant.
Table 3 (only SSA)
Endogenous Variable KAUFRUL
(SSA)
TSLS
C -4.15
(-0.80)
GNP 98 -0.03
(-0.05)
KAUFCOR 1.46
(2.11)
R2 0.13
SE 1.77
N 26
The instrumented corruption variable is significant.
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8 Concluding Comments
The purpose of this paper was to develop a regulation model integrating two main features
of LDCs, namely the lack of information suffered by regulators and the weakness of
enforcement institutions. In particular, we found that the proneness to corruption favors
low powered incentives schemes and low levels of enforcement expenditures. We have
documented empirically the positive correlation between the level of corruption and the
quality of enforcement, and we have identified a weak Africa effect which worsens the
quality of enforcement for given GNP and corruption levels. As usual the difficulty of
finding satisfactory instruments makes us very prudent in the interpretation of these
empirical results. However, this paper points towards an interesting relation between the
characteristics of an economy favoring corruption and the endogenous quality level of
desirable enforcement. We hope to document this relationship on micro data sets in the
future.
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Appendix 1
We want to show under which circumstances, when the solution characterized by (5.5)
(5.6) (5.7) dominates for the regulator the optimal self-enforcing contracts, it is indeed
the case that the efficient type does not want to renege on the contract.
With the initial contract, the β-firm obtains the utility Φ(e¯E). If the β-firm tries to
renegotiate, with probability 1 − pi(cE) the regulator who believes that he is facing an
inefficient firm (remember that we are out of equilibrium) will offer a contract yielding
U¯E + Φ(e¯∗).
So, we need
U¯E ≤ Φ(e¯E)− Φ(e∗)
or
δ ≤ λF −H2λ(Φ(e¯∗)− Φ(e¯E)),
i.e., enough inefficiency in bargaining or F large enough.
21
Appendix 2
The new participation constraint is:
ν(1− ξ)U + (1− ν)pi(c)U¯ + (1− ν)(1− pi(c))U¯B = 0.
Substituting into the government’s objective function we get:
νW (q∗, e∗, β) + ν(1− ξ)W (q, e, β + (1− ν)pi(c)W (q¯, e¯, β¯)
+(1− ν)(1− pi(c))δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯)− (1 + λ)c− λνξkΦ(e¯).
Maximizing with respect to e, q, e¯, q¯, c we obtain
qC = q∗ ; eC = e∗
−(ψ′(e¯C)− q¯C)(1 + λ)(1− ν)pi(c¯)− λνξkΦ′(e¯) = 0
S ′(q¯C) + λ[p′(q¯C)q¯c + p(q¯C)]− (1 + λ)(β¯ − e¯C) = 0
(1− ν)pi′(cC)[W (q¯C , e¯C , β¯)− δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯)]− (1 + λ) = 0.
Differentiating we obtain:
 −ψ
′′(1 + λ)(1− ν)pi(c¯)− λνξkΦ′′ (1 + λ)(1− ν)pi(c¯) −(ψ′ − q¯)(1 + λ)(1− ν)pi′
(1 + λ) S′′ + λ[p′′q + 2p′] 0
(1− ν)pi′(cC)We(q¯C , e¯C , β¯) (1− ν)pi′(cC)Wq(q¯C , e¯C , β¯) (1− ν)pi′′(W (q¯C , e¯C , β¯)− δW (q¯∗, e¯∗, β¯))



 de¯
C
dq¯C
dcC

 =

 λνξΦ
′
0
0

 dk
From the concavity of the objective function at the optimum, the Jacobian is negative.
de¯C
dk
= −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ + −
0 − 0
0 + −
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
dq¯C
dk
= −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− + −
+ 0 0
+ 0 −
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
dc¯C
dk
= −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− + +
+ − 0
+ + 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0.
Similarly we find
dcC
dξ
< 0.
Suppose that θpi(c) and that θ is an index of lack of corruption in the enforcement
system. We obtain immediately
dcC
dθ
> 0.
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Appendix 3
Rule of law variables:
Kaufrul: Rule of law; source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Zoido-Lobaton, P. 1999a,
“Aggregating Governance Indicators”, Washington DC, United States: World Bank.
Mimeographed document N =164; based on indices for 1997 and 1998.
Prslor98: law and order: strength and impartiality of the legal system and degree of
popular observance of the law; source: PRS-ICRG (Political Risk Service, International
Country Risk Guide), N = 130.
Corruption variables:
Ticorr98: 1998 Transparency International synthetic index, N = 79.
Kaufcor: Kaufmann et al. 99, N = 153; based on indices for 1997 and 1998.
Instruments for corruption:
Openness: Imports over GNP 1998, from World Bank World Development Indicators,
N = 151.
Index of price distortions: Aggregated indicator of price distortions constructed by
the method of principal components with two indices indicating the degree of price control
in the economy and the exchange rate black market premium. Source: Freedom House,
Higher score indicates less distortions, N = 119.
Control variable:
GNP98: 1998 GNP per capita in current US dollars, from World Bank 2000 World De-
velopment Indicators. (GNP is GDP plus net receipts of primary income from nonresident
sources).
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